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Abstract:  
 
The article is devoted to the problem of tax risks of the state, which are described from three 
standpoints: as damage; through a combination of factors that define them; and from the 
standpoint of the probabilistic nature of their implementation. It is underlined that the 
competitive risk of the tax system is closely related to the process of tax competition.  
 
The country tax competition is illustrated by the experience of the European Union member 
states in reducing corporate income tax rates during the period of the European Union 
expansion in 2004 and 2007. The statistical data are provided to confirm the trend of the 
reduction of tax rates by the EU member states in the context of economic integration. The 
experience of the regions of the Russian Federation is described as an example of tax 
competition at the regional level. The option of assessing the scale of regions’ introduction of 
tax competition tools available in the conditions of modern Russian model of tax federalism 
is proposed.  
 
The comparative analysis of introduction of tax competition tools by regions and advance of 
the tax revenue growth over the growth of the regional economy is carried out. The absence 
of an unambiguous relationship between the scale of the introduction of the tax competition 
tools and the growth of tax revenues is shown by the example of the regions of the Central 
Federal District. The absence of such dependence is determined by similar taxation 
conditions in the regions of the Russian Federation, which describe broad prospects for the 
development of tax competition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Dialectics of tax relations in the modern state and development of research in the tax 
field predetermined the need to separate tax risk in the system of the market 
economy risks. Initially, the tax risk became a subject of research of lawyers in the 
domestic science; the most serious results of research are presented in the paper by 
Shhekin "Tax risks and trends in the development of tax law" (Shhekin, 2007). The 
economists' attention focused on tax risks later, and currently management of tax 
risks, which is called "tax risk management" in foreign English-language literature, 
is one of the key problems in this field (KPMG, 2004; EYGM, 2004). At the same 
time, when it comes to tax risks, a microlevel is generally meant, that is, the tax risks 
of economic entities – taxpayers (Grant Thornton, 2016; Stroeva et al., 2015; 
Thalassinos and Liapis, 2014), but the tax risks emerge at the macro- and meso-
levels as well – they are the tax risks of the state. The issue of the tax risks of the 
state is quite new for modern financial science – its active exploration began in the 
last 6-7 years. One of the conceptual works in this area was the monograph "Tax 
risks of the state" published in 2014 and prepared by the collective of authors of the 
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation (Goncharenko 
et al., 2014). 
 
The urgency of the study is determined by the need to search for and develop tools 
to minimize the tax risks of the state in the context of continued fiscal consolidation, 
and the risk of reducing the competitiveness of the tax system, which is intensified 
due to the increasing mobility of tax bases. The goal of the study is to define the 
possibilities and prospects for introducing the tax competition tools as a component 
of minimization of the competitive risk of the tax system at the regional level in 
Russia based on the study of their current state and the experience of the country-
level tax competition in the European Union. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
Methods of theoretical and empirical cognition were used in this study. Theoretical 
research was carried out through methods of analysis and synthesis, induction and 
deduction, as well as through ascent from the abstract to the concrete. Approaches to 
defining the state's tax risks and reasons for their occurrence were systematized 
through theoretical cognition; the category of competitive risk of the tax system was 
analyzed as one of the components of the tax risk of the state, including as part of 
the relationship with the tax competition process. 
 
The empirical study was embodied in the analysis of experience and economic effect 
of tax competition at the national level – among the European Union member states 
- and at the regional level - among the regions of the Russian Federation. Statistical 
and economic analysis, ranking and expert assessments were used as empirical 
methods of research (Thalassinos and Dafnos, 2015; Thalassinos and Kiriazidis, 
2003). 
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3. Results 
 
3.1 Tax risks of the State: Definition and occurrence 
 
Since taxpayers and the state are both the subjects of tax relations, the tax risks occur 
for each of them. There is no single definition of the tax risks of the state at present, 
but the following approaches can be distinguished among the diversity of opinions: 
 
From the standpoint of its probabilistic nature: The tax risk of the state is the 
probability (threat) of tax shortfall in the budget because of the taxpayers employing 
methods of minimizing taxation that are possible due to various shortcomings in tax 
legislation (Pinskaja, 2009; Shekhovtsov et al., 2017). 
 
As damage: The tax risk of the state is material losses caused by shrinking tax 
revenues to the budgetary system, a systemic narrowing of the tax base due to 
shrinking business and investment volumes and expansion of the shadow economy 
(Goncharenko, 2009). 
 
Through a combination of factors that define it: The tax risk of the state is the 
likelihood of a reduction in the receipt of taxes and fees due to insufficiently 
justified changes in tax legislation, inefficient activities of tax and customs 
authorities to control the payment of taxes and fees, as well as refund of financial 
resources to taxpayers if they were obtained by the state due to unlawful actions of 
officials of regulating bodies (Panskov, 2013; Akopova and Przhedetskaya, 2016). 
 
The reason for the occurrence of tax risks is determined by the very financial nature 
of the tax, by the implementation of its fiscal function, the success of which ensures 
sufficient volume of the budget tax revenues and causes tax risks for a taxpayer, 
while the shortcomings of its implementation lead to a reduction in the tax burden 
and tax revenues of budgets, revealing in the tax risks of the state. In general, the tax 
risk of the state is revealed in the reduction of the budget tax revenues and in their 
failure to achieve the target level. However, depending on the factors, it can be 
expressed in: the tax base reduction, the tax burden growth, taxes and fees evasion, 
application of schemes to minimize tax payments by taxpayers, vagueness and 
uncertainty of the tax legislation wording, abuse of tax benefits by taxpayers, 
inefficiency of tax benefits, inefficiency and errors of tax control and administration, 
lower competitiveness of the tax system. It must be noted that each of these risks is 
of interest for a separate study. Let’s review the latter – the competitive risk of the 
tax system – in more detail. 
 
3.2 Competitive risk of the tax system 
 
Stability of the principles of a market economy and the globalization development 
predetermined the dissemination of the competition principles in all areas of the 
society’s life, including tax relations. This is referred to competition in the field of 
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production of public goods within the framework of the Tiebout hypothesis, which 
assumes the competition of territorial administrations for attracting taxpayers in 
conditions of their possible migration, determined by the search for the optimal set 
of public goods provided in combination with the corresponding level of taxation 
(Tiebout, 1958; Shmaliy and Dushakova, 2017; Pociovalisteanu and Thalassinos, 
2008). 
 
The competitive risk of the tax system is revealed in the reduction of the budget tax 
revenues because the level of the tax burden combined with the set of benefits 
provided to the taxpayer in the given state (administrative entity) becomes 
uncompetitive in comparison with other states (administrative entities). It must be 
emphasized that this type of tax risk is inherent not only to national tax systems, but 
also to sub-federal tax systems in federal states, where regional authorities are 
granted tax authority to establish tax rates and introduce taxes (to a greater or lesser 
extent). 
 
The category of "competitive risk of the tax system" is closely linked to the process 
of tax competition, which is the relationship between territorial units regarding 
attracting taxpayers to register on their territory by creating favorable tax climate 
and reducing the tax burden. Tax competition is revealed in horizontal (between 
one-level territorial units for tax bases exclusively) and vertical (between levels of 
power in one state for tax authorities) perspectives. The horizontal tax competition 
can be between countries, between regions and municipal entities. The first two 
types will be reviewed in this article. 
 
Country-level tax competition was most clearly revealed in the European Union. The 
key tools of tax competition here are measures in the field of rate changes and the 
introduction of tax incentives for personal income tax (PIT) and corporate income 
tax (CIT). The use of progressive taxation opens wide prospects for the competition 
development, and the taxation conditions in the Russian Federation are competitive 
in this case, which became widely known due to the fact of granting Russian 
citizenship to several well-known foreigners. For example, according to VCIOM 
(Russian Public Opinion Research Center), Russians consider withdrawal from high 
tax rates one of the main reasons for celebrities to choose Russian citizenship by 
(22% of respondents) (VCIOM, 2017). 
 
Regional tax competition will be reviewed by the example of the regions of the 
Russian Federation, which have certain possibilities for introducing tax competition 
tools within the current tax system. 
 
3.3 Tax competition: Experience of the European Union 
 
Country-level tax competition for attracting mobile taxpayers and their tax bases is a 
multidimensional phenomenon. Legal tax competition in the EU exclusively is 
reviewed in this article. "Illegally" established tax competition in the form of 
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schemes to attract tax bases from abroad or the formation of offshore zones will 
remain out of sight in this case. 
 
Cross-country tax competition in the EU has been developing for as long as more 
than half a century. It reached special intensity with two expansions of 2004 and 
2007 for a total of 13 new member states which, compared to traditional members, 
had a relatively low level of tax burden in direct taxes. Since the beginning of the 
2008 global financial and economic crisis, crisis measures have significantly limited 
the possibilities of tax competition thanks to the initiative of the European 
Commission to strengthen coordination of tax policy within the EU. First, this was 
expressed by the fact that many EU countries required budget consolidation, which 
was aggravated by large-scale assistance to banks and operation of automatic 
stabilizers. In its turn, budget consolidation severely limits the space for tax cuts. 
However, the further development of tax competition in the EU has not stopped. 
Later, at the stage of recovery from the recession, many EU countries began to use 
the tax competition tools again with the improvement in the budget situation. The 
dynamics of corporate income tax rates in the EU countries in 1995-2016 can serve 
as an example. The data on tax rates are presented in Table 1 based on the relevant 
KPMG materials (КPMG, 2017), the calculations were made by the authors. 
 
Table 1. Corporate income tax rates in the European Union, 1995 – 2016, % 
(КPMG, 2017). 
Country 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 
Change, p.p. 
1995-
2016 
2008-
2016 
Belgium 40.2 40.2 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 -6.2 0 
Denmark 34.0 32.0 28.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 24.5 23.5 22.0 -12.0 -3.0 
Finland 25.0 29.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 -5.0 -6.0 
Germany 56.8 51.6 38.6 29.5 29.4 29.4 29.6 29.7 29.7 -27.1 +0.2 
Greece 40.0 40.0 32.0 25.0 25.0 24.0 26.0 29.0 29.0 -11.0 +4.0 
Spain 35.0 35.0 35.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 28.0 25.0 -10.0 -5.0 
France 36.7 36.7 35.0 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 -3.4 0 
Ireland 40.0 24.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 -27.5 0 
Italy 52.2 41.3 37.3 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 -20.8 0 
Luxembourg 40.9 37.5 30.4 29.6 28.6 28.6 29.2 29.2 29.2 -11.7 -0.4 
Netherlands 35.0 35.0 31.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.0 25.0 25.0 -10.0 -0.5 
Austria 34.0 34.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 -9.0 0 
Portugal 39.6 35.2 27.5 25.0 25.0 25.0 23.0 23.0 21.0 -18.6 -4.0 
Sweden 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 26.3 26.3 22.0 22.0 22.0 -6.0 -6.0 
United 
Kingdom 
33.0 33.0 30.0 30.0 28.0 28.0 21.0 20.0 20.0 -13.0 -10.0 
Average for 
EU-15 
38.0 35.5 30.1 27.3 27.0 26.9 25.8 25.7 25.3 -12.8 -2.0 
Standard 
deviation 
7.9 6.3 6.1 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.5 5.6 5.7 7.3 3.4 
Coefficient 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.23   
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Country 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 
Change, p.p. 
1995-
2016 
2008-
2016 
of variation 
Range of 
variation 
31.8 27.6 26.1 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 24.1 14.0 
Czech 
Republic 
41.0 31.0 26.0 21.0 20.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 -22.0 -2.0 
Estonia 26.0 26.0 24.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 20.0 20.0 -6.0 -1.0 
Latvia 25.0 25.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 -10.0 0.0 
Lithuania 29.0 24.0 15.0 15.0 20.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 -14.0 0 
Hungary 19.6 19.6 16.0 16.0 16.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 -0.6 +3.0 
Slovenia 25.0 25.0 25.0 22.0 21.0 20.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 -8.0 -5.0 
Slovak 
Republic 
40.0 29.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 -18.0 +3.0 
Poland 40.0 30.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 -11.0 0 
Malta 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 0 0 
Cyprus 25.0 29.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 -12.5 +2.5 
Bulgaria 40.0 35.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 -30.0 0 
Romania 38.0 38.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 -22. 0 
Croatia 25.0 35.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 -5.0 0 
Average for 
EU-13 
31.4 29.4 19.6 18.4 18.6 18.3 18.5 18.4 18.4 -12.2 0.0 
Standard 
deviation 
7.4 5.2 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 8.5 2.0 
Coefficient 
of variation 
0.23 0.18 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31   
Range of 
variation 
21.4 18.4 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 30.0 8.0 
Average for 
EU-28 
35.0 32.6 25.2 23.2 23.1 22.9 22.4 22.3 22.1 -12.5 -1.1 
Difference 
between EU-
15 and EU-
13 
6.6 6.1 10.4 8.9 8.4 8.6 7.3 7.3 6.9 -0.5 -2.1 
 
Most of the old and a part of new EU states reduced corporate income tax rates in 
2008-2009 to minimize the consequences of the crisis. Later, the post-crisis stage of 
development was described by the stability of tax rates in the new member states 
and their continuing reduction in the old states, which is explained, firstly, by the 
availability of reserves for reduction, since the level of the tax burden was initially 
higher in the old member states and, secondly, by greater stability of the EU-15 
economies relative to the new EU states. In general, the data provided in Table 1 
show a stable trend of decline in the corporate income tax rates in the EU over the 
past two decades (both for EU-15 and EU-13), which is determined by 
intensification of country-level tax competition in the context of economic 
integration and increasing mobility of taxpayers. It must be underlined that standard 
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deviation and coefficient of variation confirm the homogeneity of the populations 
under study. The thesis on the general trend of reducing corporate income tax rates 
in the EU is clearly illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Corporate income tax rates in the European Union, 1995 – 2016, % 
(КPMG, 2017). 
 
 
Development of the state-level tax competition requires two necessary conditions: 
first, the relevant tax bases must be mobile and elastic relative to different levels of 
tax burden (tax rates) in different countries and, secondly, tax regulation should be 
like a certain extent. Currently, there are empirical studies on the elasticity of foreign 
direct investment relative to the corporate income tax rates. For instance, De Mooij 
and Ederveen (2003) summarized more than 25 empirical studies and determined the 
average value of -3.3% for the elasticity of tax rates: after reduction in the corporate 
income tax rate in the host country by 1 p.p. (percentage point), foreign direct 
investment in the economy of this country increases by 3.3%. 
 
As such, the country-level tax competition is an actual phenomenon that is clearly 
revealed in the EU, for example, in terms of taxation of corporate income. It seems 
that when the rate reductions in the EU are still ongoing in the old countries and, 
since recently, have ceased in the new countries, further consolidation of the 
taxation conditions in the EU in general is possible. 
 
There is no agreement among researchers on the issue of the impact of tax 
competition on the economic development. The predominantly positive effect is 
described by the authors who work within the framework of the public choice theory 
and expect predictable efficient impact of tax competition on an inefficient 
unpredictable public sector (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977; Musaeva et al., 2017). At 
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the same time, this dependence can hardly be proved empirically, and therefore only 
theoretical studies exist so far. Nevertheless, it is assumed that part of the long-term 
reduction in the limit of public spending in all European countries has had a positive 
impact on the public-sector efficiency (Shratcenshtaller, 2011). However, an 
undesirable effect of excessively intense tax competition can also emerge. For 
example, too intense tax competition can limit the income potential and lead to 
inefficient provision with public goods (economies of scale). Besides, the so far 
insufficiently studied phenomenon of tax competition can be a catalyst for reducing 
the role of the corporate income tax as an automatic stabilizer of economic 
development, which can lead to an increasing amplitude of economic cycles, when 
crises will become deeper and longer. 
 
It is also necessary to take other problems of tax competition into consideration in 
terms of corporate taxation. Firstly, there is a risk of irrational use of capital 
resulting from distortion of investment decisions under the influence of lower tax 
rates. Secondly, there are prerequisites for using the tax optimization schemes. For 
instance, the placement of subsidiaries in countries with a lower level of tax burden 
is primarily relevant for transnational corporations, while enterprises focused on the 
domestic market are limited in this way of reducing the tax burden. 
 
The above problems require some harmonization of the corporate taxation in the EU. 
Transnational corporations that must interact with 28 different taxation systems also 
speak in support of this option. The area of harmonization is the replacement of 
existing national rules for income definition by common for the EU, which will 
contribute to increasing the transparency of tax rates established by countries and the 
tax competition transparency. 
 
As such, the experience of the European Union shows that the country-level tax 
competition can play a significant role for the entire regional unification, despite the 
absence of the single reliable assessment of its impact on economic development. At 
the same time, it is important not to look past the competitive risk of the national tax 
system – when the EU states must assess the ratio of tax burden levels among the 
member states to approve the rate at the optimal level. Optimality is determined 
from the standpoint of not just creating favorable tax conditions for attracting mobile 
tax bases, but also minimizing the risk of reducing tax revenues, which is precisely 
the competitive risk of the national tax system. 
 
3.4 Horizontal tax competition of regions in the Russian Federation 
 
The most vivid example of horizontal tax competition at the sub-federal level in 
Russia is reduction in the corporate income tax rate in the Perm region in 2009: the 
tax rate was reduced from 20 to 15.5% at the expense of the budget of the region of 
the Russian Federation. In the year when the rate was reduced, the tax revenues from 
the corporate income tax in the Perm region declined by 43%, which was, inter alia, 
due to the impact of the global financial and economic crisis and the general rate 
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reduction from 24% in the Russian Federation. However, as soon as in 2010, there 
was an increase in the revenue from the corporate income tax by 34% in the Perm 
region, in 2011 - by 25%, in 2012 - by 29%, and each year the growth rates were 
higher than average for the Russian Federation, but investment in fixed assets in the 
Perm region rose more than 4.5 times at the very year of rate reduction (Pugachev, 
2014). The neighboring Sverdlovsk region also had to reduce the rate to 15.5% in 
2011 due to tax competition, but there was no time lag in this case at all due to a 
more favorable market situation. Investment in fixed assets and revenue from 
corporate income tax increased as soon as in 2011 – the year of rate reduction. 
 
The reduction in the corporate income tax rate is the most ambitious measure in the 
framework of horizontal tax competition of the regions, but it can be ensured using 
other tools – for example, tax benefits for income tax for certain types of activities, 
reduction of rates for regional and local taxes, development of favorable 
administrative conditions for a taxpayer in comparison with neighboring regions, 
etc. Let’s see what tools are currently used by Russian regions for the purposes of 
establishment of competitive tax position. Table 2 presents the summarized data 
from the investment portals of the regions and the websites of the regional 
authorities of the Russian Federation on the use of certain tax competition tools in 
the regions of the Central Federal District (CFD) of the Russian Federation: 
reduction of the corporate income tax rate in the part credited to the sub-federal 
budget, provision of the investment tax credit, granting tax benefits to participants of 
priority investment projects included in the registers of investment projects at the 
regional level. 
 
Table 2. Tax competition tools used by the CFD regions. 
 
Region 
Reduction of the corporate 
income tax rate 
Investment 
tax credit 
Tax benefits for 
participants of priority 
investment projects 
Belgorod 
region 
For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
Balance as of 
01.01.2017 is 
3.5 mln rub. 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax and property 
tax for participants of 32 
projects 
Bryansk region For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax and property 
tax for participants of 100 
projects 
Vladimir 
region 
For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax and property 
tax for participants of 
more than 100 projects 
Voronezh 
region 
For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax, property tax 
and transport tax for 
participants of 87 projects 
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Ivanovo region For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax and property 
tax for participants of 17 
projects 
Kaluga region For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax and property 
tax for participants of 94 
projects 
Kostroma 
region 
For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax and property 
tax for participants of 20 
projects with a total 
investment of 36 bln rub. 
Kursk Region For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax and property 
tax for participants of 72 
projects 
Lipetsk region For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax, property tax, 
land tax, transport tax, 
VAT (for SEZ (special 
economic zone) residents) 
for participants of 93 
projects 
Moscow region For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax and property 
tax for participants of 11 
projects with a total 
volume of 18.2 bln rub. 
Oryol Region For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for 
participants of 29 projects 
Ryazan Oblast For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax, property tax, 
simplified tax system for 
participants of 6 projects 
Smolensk 
region 
For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax and property 
tax for participants of 20 
projects 
Tambov region For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
property tax and land tax 
for participants of 41 
projects with a total 
investment of 54 bln rub. 
Tver region None 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
property tax and land tax 
for participants of 73 
projects with a total 
investment of 447.2 bln 
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rub. 
Tula region For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
Balance as of 
01.01.2017 is 
54.8 mln rub. 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax, property tax, 
land tax, transport tax for 
participants of 44 projects 
Yaroslavl 
region 
For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax, property tax 
and land tax for 
participants of 24 
investment projects with a 
total investment of 53.3 
bln rub. 
Moscow For certain categories of 
taxpayers 
- 
Tax benefits for corporate 
income tax, property tax 
and land tax for 
participants of 30 
investment priority 
projects with a total 
investment of 26.1 bln 
rub. 
 
Assessment of the data presented in Table 2 allows to make the following 
conclusions. First, all the CFD regions without exception use tax competition tools. 
Secondly, the set and the scale of these tools in most of the CFD regions are 
comparable. Thus, in all regions, except for the Tver region, the corporate income 
tax rate was reduced to some extent in the part credited to the regional budget. The 
investment tax credit is not used in any region, except for the Belgorod and Tula 
regions. Absolutely all regions grant tax benefits to the participants of priority 
investment projects. Most of the regions of the Federation have introduced benefits 
in regional and local taxes (corporate property tax, transport tax, land tax), as well as 
the corporate income tax (here the benefits largely correspond to the reduction in the 
corporate income tax rate in general, and in some regions the rate is reduced only for 
participants of the priority investment projects). The VAT benefits are introduced 
for residents of the Lipetsk Special Economic Zone. 
 
To rank regions by using tax competition tools for each of the three components, 
let’s assign scores of 0, 1, or 2 to the regions based on an expert estimation of the 
scale of implementation of each tool. Besides, let’s compare the results obtained 
with the lead coefficient of the total realized tax potential growth of regions (TPR) 
over the gross regional product (GRP) growth. It must be noted that the lead 
coefficient was calculated based on the growth rates in 2014 in relation to 2013, i.e. 
according to the latest relevant official GRP data published in the Russian Statistical 
Yearbook 2016. The time lag in this case can be neglected, since there have been no 
significant changes in the use of the tax competition tools since 2014-2015. The 
results of the ranking and calculations of the authors are presented in Table 3. The 
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data from the Federal Tax Service (2017) and the Federal State Statistics Service 
(2016) served as the information base for the calculations. 
 
Table 3. Assessment of the use of the tax competition tools by the CFD regions 
(Federal Tax Service, 2017; Federal State Statistics Service, 2016). 
 
Region 
Region score  
TPR 
growt
h rate, 
% 
GRP 
growth 
rate, % 
Lead 
coefficient 
Reduction 
of the 
corporate 
income 
tax rate 
Investment 
tax credit 
Tax 
benefits for 
participant
s of 
priority 
investment 
projects 
Total 
scor
e 
Belgorod 
region 
1 1 2 4 103.3 108.9 0.95 
Bryansk 
region 
1 0 2 3 95.4 110.7 0.86 
Vladimir 
region 
1 0 2 3 113.6 106.9 1.06 
Voronezh 
region 
1 0 2 3 106.1 115.9 0.92 
Ivanovo 
region 
1 0 1 2 103.4 95.5 1.08 
Kaluga 
region 
1 0 2 3 116.8 111.0 1.05 
Kostroma 
region 
1 0 1 2 103.0 105.3 0.98 
Kursk 
Region 
1 0 2 3 101.8 109.5 0.93 
Lipetsk 
region 
1 0 2 3 140.7 125.4 1.12 
Moscow 
region 
1 0 1 2 109.9 106.3 1.03 
Oryol 
Region 
1 0 1 2 107.6 109.1 0.99 
Ryazan 
Oblast 
1 0 1 2 84.4 106.5 0.79 
Smolensk 
region 
1 0 1 2 116.4 103.9 1.12 
Tambov 
Region 
1 0 1 2 124.1 116.7 1.06 
Tver 
region 
0 0 2 2 108.3 102.9 1.05 
Tula 
region 
1 1 2 4 134.7 117.4 1.15 
Yaroslavl 
region 
1 0 1 2 107.0 107.0 1.00 
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Moscow  1 0 1 2 105.3 108.4 0.97 
Average for CFD 2.56 110.1 109.3 1.01 
Standard deviation 0.68 12.9 6.4 0.09 
Coefficient of variation 0.27 0.12 0.06 0.09 
 
All the CFD regions scored 2 to 4 (out of 6 possible). The Belgorod and Tula 
regions got the maximum score of 4, 6 regions scored 3, 10 regions scored 2. The 
average score for the CFD was 2.56. The average TPR growth rate was 110.1%, the 
GRP growth rate was 109.3%, the average lead coefficient was 1.01 (simple 
arithmetic means were calculated). It is important that standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation for all indicators indicate the homogeneity of the population 
under study. 
 
Examination of the relationship between the scale of the use of tax benefits and their 
fiscal consequences is of fundamental importance in this issue. Let’s consider the 
indicators for the two regions that got the highest score. The Belgorod region has the 
GRP growth rate of 108.9% with the TPR growth rate of 103.3% and the lead 
coefficient of 0.95. This means that the Belgorod region as a region that has most 
widely implemented the tax competition tools has not achieved the advance of the 
tax revenue growth over the growth of the regional economy in general. The 
situation is reversed for the Tula region: the introduction of the tax competition tools 
involves significant (largest for the CFD) advance of the tax revenue growth over 
the growth of the economy (lead coefficient is 1.15). At the same time, for the 
Smolensk region, which also has one of the highest lead coefficients – 1.12, the 
score totaled just 2.  
 
For the Bryansk region, which had one of the lowest values of the lead coefficient 
(0.86), the score totaled to 3, which is above average. The CFD regions were 
conditionally divided into two groups with a score above average (3 and 4) and 
below average (2), and the average arithmetic value of the lead coefficients for each 
group was calculated. It was found that the average value of the lead coefficient will 
be 1.00 for the first group and 1.01 for the second. The provided data indicate that 
there is no significant difference in the level of tax revenue growth in the CFD 
regions depending on the development of tax competition. First, this is because the 
scale of the introduction of the tax competition tools in the regions does not differ 
significantly; regions offer taxpayers similar taxation terms. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The process of tax competition in Russian regions is currently at the development 
stage. The regions largely offer comparable taxation terms, so other (not tax) factors 
will be crucial when choosing the place of registration for taxpayers. This means 
that the competitive risk of the tax system for Russian regions is not fundamental. It 
is relevant for regions which use the tax competition tools at the time they are 
introduced in terms of the time lag between the tool implementation and the start of 
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obtaining the return from it, as well as for the remaining regions ("catching up") at 
the time before the alignment of taxation terms (as a measure to prevent reduction of 
tax revenues due to terms becoming non-competitive). 
 
At the same time, the establishment of the process of tax competition at the sub-
federal level opens prospects for the development of the tax potential of the regions 
(Parfenova et al., 2016). In the context of the current model of tax federalism in 
Russia, described by a high degree of centralization of tax authorities, it is 
nevertheless possible to further expand the range of the tax competition tools, such 
as, for example: introduction of an investment tax credit for corporate income tax; 
introduction of restrictions on the designated use of amortization premium funds for 
the renewal of fixed assets; introduction of tax holidays for small businesses in the 
real sector of the economy (Jeskindarov, 2016; Nechaev and Antipina, 2016). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The results of the conducted study indicate that the competitive risk of the tax 
system becomes one of the significant tax risks of the state and is revealed in the 
reduction of budget tax revenues because the level of the tax burden combined with 
the set of benefits provided to a taxpayer in a certain administrative entity become 
non-competitive in comparison to other administrative entities. 
 
The occurrence of the competitive risk of the tax system is associated with the 
process of horizontal tax competition between territorial entities in terms of 
attracting the taxpayers to register on their territory by creating favorable tax climate 
and reducing the tax burden. Tax competition at the country level is shown by the 
example of the European Union member states, where it was clearly revealed during 
the 2004 and 2007 expansions: for example, average corporate tax rates declined 
from 35.5% to 27.3% in old member states, and from 29.4% to 18.4% in new 
member states. The pace of rate reduction slowed down later, after the global 
financial and economic crisis. The tax competition at the regional level is described 
by the experience of the Russian Federation regions, where, despite a few vivid 
examples, the potential for introducing tax competition tools remains very wide. 
 
The issue of the impact of the tax competition process on the dynamics of tax 
revenues of territorial entities and the dynamics of their economic development in 
general remains unresolved. Currently, there is no quantitative or definite qualitative 
assessment of this relationship. The introduction of tax competition tools is aimed at 
increasing tax revenues, but it can lead to the opposite result – for example, due to 
the realization of the competitive risk of the tax system, a time lag in the short term, 
or situations where the attracted mobile tax bases do not compensate for the volume 
of lost taxes. It seems that the review of the influence of tax competition tools on the 
dynamics of tax revenues and economic development is a promising area of research 
of the risk of reducing the competitiveness of the tax system. 
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